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APPLICATION OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT CLAUSE
TO STATE PROMISES
MAURICE H.

MERRILL 11

. pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation
"No State shall .
1 Over this phrase many of the early constitutional
of Contracts . .
battles relative to state power were waged. Of late years the rank growth
springing from the exuberant soil of the Fourteenth Amendment has tended
to obscure it. Nevertheless there remain in connection therewith problems
of major importance to the constitutional lawyer. To one of these problems
this article seeks to direct attention.
As an original proposition, it seems quite arguable that the contract
clause was not intended to do away with a state's power to repudiate its own
promises. In the Constitutional Convention its proponents urged the necessity of protection against the evils of legislative interference with private
contracts. 2 The same is true of the scanty treatment accorded the clause in
The Federalist with its short reference to "sudden changes and legislative
interferences, in cases affecting individual rights". 3 But in Fletcher v.
Peck 4 John Marshall, speaking for the Supreme Court, threw the weight
of his almost unanswerable logic against so narrow a construction. Pointing out that, since the language of the clause is sweepingly general in its
application to all contracts, any exception in favor of the states "must arise
from the character of the contracting party, not from the words which are
employed", 5 he stressed heavily the unlikelihood that a convention which
broadly forbade the states to enact retrospective legislation in the form of
bills of attainder and of ex post facto laws would, without specific indication, intend to limit the application of a general prohibition against the
impairment of contract obligations." The position thus taken has been ret B. A., gig, LL. B., 1922, University of Oklahoma; S. J. D., 1925, Harvard University;
Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; author of COVENANTS IMPLIED
IN OIL AND GAS LEASES (1926), and of numerous articles in legal periodicals.
I U. S. CONST. Art. I, § Io.
' See WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928)
ERmm, THE LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL (1919) 557, n. 3.
8
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (Lodge's ed. 1888) 279.

553-557.

See also 3 BEV-

&io U. S. 87 (18io).
Ibid. 137.
6 "No state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.
"A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property,
or may do both.
"In this form the power of the legislature over the lives and fortunes of individuals is
expressly restrained. What motive, then, for implying, in words which import a general prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts, an exception in favor of the right to impair
the obligation of those contracts into which the state may enter?

(639)
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affirmed repeatedly by the court in numerous utterances. 7 As stated by
Mr. Justice Swayne:
"when a state becomes a party to a contract, ..
. the same rules
of law are applied to her as to private persons under like circumstances.
When she or her representatives are properly brought into the forum
of litigation, neither she nor they can assert any right or immunity as
incident to her political sovereignty." 8
Whether the men of 1787 were here particularly concerned with state
repudiation or not, it is no doubt true that the same regard for vested rights
which led them to condemn interference with private contracts would have
brought them to make the same prohibition of state repudiation had the
point been called specifically to their attention. Viewed in this light Judge
Marshall's position seems fully justified; its repeated acceptance emphasizes
the conclusion.
All problems are not solved, however, by the formula that a state may
contract and that its covenants will be protected by the Constitution of the
United States from impairment. Many bargains between private persons
fail to find shelter under the contract clause. Limitations on the power to
make compacts, whether arising from the legal status of the parties, from
the subject matter of the agreement, or from its object, bar the way. May
there not exist similar barriers to the ability of a state to bind itself without
recourse? If it be the part of a sound public policy to protect the individual
against certain of his promises, may there not be equal reasons for a similar
policy with respect to bargains made by a government? The public servants
are not always omniscient and incorruptible. Distinguished authority to the
contrary notwithstanding, 9 it is the purpose of this article to show that
"The state legislatures can pass no ex post facto law. An ex post facto law is one which
renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punished when it was committed.
Such a law may inflict penalties on the person, or may inflict pecuniary penalties which swell
the public treasury. The legislature is then prohibited from passing a law by which a man's
estate, or any part of it, shall be seized for a crime which was not declared, by some previous
law, to render him liable to that punishment. Why, then, should violence be done to the
natural meaning of words .for the purpose of leaving to the legislature the power of seizing,
for public use, the estate of an individual in the form of a law annulling the title by which he
holds that estate? The court can conceive no sufficient grounds for making that distinction.
This rescinding act would have the effect of an ex post facto law. It forfeits the estate of
Fletcher for a crime not committed by himself, but by those from whom he purchased. This
cannot be effected in the form of an ex Post facto law, or bill of attainder; why, then, is it
allowable in the form of a law annulling the original grant?" Fletcher v. Peck, supra note
4, at 138.
'See Goszler v. Georgetown, 19 U. S. 593, 597 (1821) ; Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop,
57 U. S. 369, 389 (1853) ; The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U. S. 5I, 74 (1865) ; Broughton v.
Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266, 269 (1876) ; Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548, 556 (1879);
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 297, 5 Sup. Ct. 9o3, 962 (I885).
'Davis v. Gray, 83 U. S. 203, 232 (873).
o"It is argued, as a reason why courts should not be rigid in enforcing the contracts
made by states, that legislative bodies are often overreached by designing men, and dispose of
franchises with great recklessness.
"If the knowledge that a contract made by a state with individuali is equally protected
from invasion as a contract made between natural persons, does not awaken watchfulness and

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT CLAUSE AND STATE PROMISES

641

watchfulness of the citizen is not the sole safeguard against official malfeasances and misfeasances.
State Sovereignty
The point that there must exist some limit to state contractual capacity
was early made. Naturally enough, in an age when states' rights were the
major concern of publicists, the earliest arguments for limiting the power
of the states to contract were based on a contention that the state could not
contract away its sovereignty, whatever might be meapat by that term. Its
first appearance seems to occur in the argument of Henry Clay in Green v.
Biddle:
"It is incontestable that there are some attributes of sovereignty,
of which a State cannot be deprived, even with the concurrence of
Congress. and the State itself.

.

.

. This implied prohibition extends

to every compact, in every form, by which a State attempts to deprive
itself of its sovereign faculties." 10
To this Mr. Justice Washington, speaking for the Court, responded
acidly, after pointing out that the state and the Federal Constitution respectively impose certain limitations on "sovereignty", "If, then, the principle contended for be a sound one, we can only say, that it is one of a most
alarming nature, but which, it is believed, cannot be seriously entertained by
any American statesman or jurist." 11
The remark probably was not stimulating to Mr. Clay's sense of vanity,
but it seems clear that Judge Washington laid his finger upon the vulnerable
point of the argument. Sovereignty as a concept by which to set the bounds
to state contractual capacity is utterly useless, since sovereignty, in the sense
of unlimited and uncontrolled power, does not exist in any American state.
Federal constitutional limitations cannot live side by side with state sovereignty. To adopt the suggested test therefore would be either to set no
limits at all to contractual power or to destroy the contract clause as a binding restriction upon the states. The untenable nature of the argument, however, did not seem so apparent to men who were accustomed to think of their
states as superior to the nation. Accordingly the Court found itself again
called upon to deny its validity.'1 2 On one occasion even the judges themselves were so impressed with the argument as to be led solemnly to explain
care on the part of lawmakers, it is difficult to perceive what would. The corrective to improvident legislation is not in the courts, but is to be found elsewhere." Davis, J., in The
Binghamton Bridge, 70 U. S. 51, 74 (1865). See also Wilmington R. R. v. Reid, 8o U. S.
264, 266 (1872).
"21 U. S. 1, 42 (1823).

"Ibid. 88.
"Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S.42o (1837) ; Humphrey v. Pegues,
83 U. S. 244, 249 (1873) ; Ohio L. Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Debolt, 57 U. S. 416 (1853).
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that the power to contract irrevocably is an essential characteristic of sovereignty! 13
In somewhat different form, the sovereignty theory may have borne
fruit in the rule that subordinate governmental units may not bind the state
by contract. 14 Meanwhile a suggestion by Mr. Justice Story, in the Dartmouth College case, 15 that the effect of holding a private corporate charter
to be a binding contract, unchangeable by the state without the corporation's
assent, might be overcome by the reservation of a right of amendment, was
adopted generally by state legislatures. In an increasing number of states
this reservation was put into the constitutions as a definite limitation upon
6
the contractual power of the legislatures in that particular field,' and was
17
A little later a state's compact was
given effect by the Supreme Court.
held unenforcible on general grounds without resort to state constitutional
The theory that not all state agreements were necessarily
limitations.'
binding had definitely arrived. Since then analysis has been *directed more
particularly to a classification of state agreements into those lying within
the competence of the state and those lying outside thereof, and to a consideration of the factors determining into which group the particular contract shall fall: Arguments based upon abstract and erroneous theories of
state sovereignty have passed into oblivion. To a detailed examination of
the results of this work of assortment and classification we now turn.
ConstitutionalLimitations
One of the outstanding features of American public law has been the
agency theory of government with its corollarial proposition that the people
as principals may give binding instructions to their governmental agents,
these instructions finding expression in constitutional limitations enforced
by the courts. Once this power to impose legally binding limits upon the
competence of government is established there is of course no difficulty
whatever in admitting its exercise to set limits to contractual capacity. The
particular form of the limitation may vary with the whimsies of constitution makers or with the subject matter involved. It may take the form of
reserving to the state power over a given subject matter as in the case of the
common provisions for amending corporate charters or for regulating
Piaua Branch Bk. v. Knoop, 57 U. S. 369, 387 (1853).
See dicta of Marshall, C. I., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, i7 U. S. 518, 629
(18iq) and of Story, J., ibid. at 694 which bore fruit in East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge
"

Co., 5i U. S. 51, (i85o).

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra note 14, at 712.

See 7

FLzrcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF COR.PORATIONS (1931)

818.

Aspinwall v. Daviess County, 63 U. S. 364 (i86o) appears to be the first case dealing
with such a provision as a constitutional limitation upon the legislature's power to contract.
Chief Justice Taney, in Ohio L. Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Debolt, 57 U. S. 416, 431 (1853) had suggested a somewhat different theory, namely, that a legislature possessed no power to bind the
state by contract unless the state constitution delegated such power to it.
I Taylor v. Thomas, 89 U. S. 479 (1875).
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utility rates. As Mr. Justice Miller has said, a power "thus conferred cannot be limited or bargained away by any act of the legislature because the
power itself is beyond legislative control." '" In other cases the limitation
takes the form of a prohibition of the exercise of a permitted power in a
specified way.20 In still other cases the prohibition is upon the granting of
particular favors, such as tax exemptions or exclusive franchises. Under
such a provision, since government is powerless to grant the boon at all, it
clearly may not do so by way of contract. 2 1 Regardless of the form used in
limiting the contractual power, the essential point is that the people have
denied to their representatives contractual power over a particular subject.
The matters thus withdrawn from the sphere of the bargaining power
are as diverse as the views of constitution makers. One of the most common
uses to which the limitation on the contractual power has been put is to
remove from corporate charters some of the protection afforded them under
the Dartmouth College case 22 by providing that all such charters shall be
subject to alteration, amendment or repeal. There are numerous cases
denying full contractual effect to charters granted subject to such a limitation,2 3 though it must be admitted that in some respects the Court seems to
have let its desire to prevent what is thought to be injustice to corporators
override the plain intent and meaning of such provisions.2 4 In such cases,
however, the limitations judicially imposed upon this sort of regulation have
consistently taken the form of "interpretation" of the meaning of reserved
power clauses. 25 At least, in the absence of a square decision upon the
' See New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 1o4, 1I (1877).

' Aspinwall v. Daviess County, supra note 17; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645 (Q877);
Zane v. Hamilton County, i89 U. S. 370, 23 Sup. Ct. 538 (1903) ; Detroit United Ry. v.
Detroit, 255 U. S. 171, Ii Sup. Ct. 285 (1921).

"The Constitution . . . adopted in i87o requires that all property should be taxed.
After that Constitution went into effect, no valid contract could be made with a corporation
for an exemption from taxation." Memphis & Charleston R. R. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697, 709

(1878).

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. 518 (1819).
v. State, 93 U. S. 567 (1873) ; Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 18i (1877);
Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S.319 (1877) ; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S.25 (1878) ; Railway Co. v. Philadelphia, 1o1 U. S. 528 (188o) ; Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler,
110 U. S.347, 4 Sup. Ct. 48 (1884) ; Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. S.
258, 13 Sup. Ct. 90 (1892) ; Schurz v. Cook, 148 U. S. 397, 13 Sup. Ct. 645 (1893) ; New
'Miller

York & N. E. R. R. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 14 Sup Ct. 437 (1894); Looker v. Maynard,
179 U. S. 46, 21 Sup. Ct.21 (19oo) ; Northern Cent. Ry. v. Maryland, 187 U. S. 258, 23 Sup.
Ct. 62 (1qo2) ; Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin & King's River Canal & Irr. Co., 192 U. S.
201, 24 Sup. Ct. 241 (1904) ; Polk v. Mutual Res. Fund L. Ass'n, 207 U. S. 310. 28 Sup. Ct.
65 (igo7) ; Hammond Pkg. Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 29 Sup. Ct 370 (19o4) ; Noble
St. Bk. v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911) ; Sears v. Akron, 246 U. S. 242, 38
Sup. Ct. 245 (1918) ; Ft. Smith Lt. & Trac. Co. v. Board of Improvement, 274 U. S. 387, 47
Sup. Ct. 595 (1927).
" See Stem, The Limitations of the Power of a State under the Reserved Right to
Amend or Repeal Chartersof Incorporation (I9o5) 53 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. i; Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters (0927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 585,
723, for detailed discussion of the limitations upon the reserved power to alter, amend or
repeal.
0 Examples, a few among many, are afforded by Asylum v. New Orleans, xo5 U. S. 362
(1882) ; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U. S. 453, 26 Sup. Ct. 65o (i9o6);
Superior Water, Lt. & Pow. Co. v. Superior, 263 U. S. 125, 44 Sup. Ct. 82 (1923).
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point, there seems no reason for assuming that the Supreme Court would
not give effect to a state constitutional provision which retained in the legislature by express language complete and unbridled control over the affairs,
26
contracts and property of all corporations thereafter chartered.
Other objectives sought and gained through constitutional limitations
27
on the contracting power have included prohibition of tax exemptions,
regulation of governmental subscriptions to railroad stock 2 8 or other forms
of assistance to such enterprises, 2 9 regulation of grants of public utility
franchises, 30 and control of the rate-fixing power.3" For states which have
a definite public policy, permanent in character, with reference to matters
regarded as of prime importance, the device of the constitutional restriction
appears to be a most useful and desirable safeguard against excessive legislative generosity.
Illegality
Aside from statutory and constitutional limitations, contracts between
man and man often fail because they fall athwart of a policy of the common
law. It needed no statute to establish that a court could not be forced to
entertain a highwayman's suit for an accounting from his partner, nor be
called upon to enforce agreements not criminal but regarded as inimical to
the public welfare, such as contracts in restraint of marriage. May there
be similar principles of public policy, not arising from constitutional prohibitions, which will place the mark of illegality upon compacts made by
a state?
This much it seems may safely be stated, that it must be a federal public
policy the rules of which are thus applied. Inasmuch as next to the constitutional convention the legislature wields the policy-determining power of
the state, it would be a headstrong and lawless court indeed that, lacking
constitutional sanction, undertook to enthrone its idea of public policy above
that of the legislature. If it be suggested that contracts frequently are made
by executive or administrative officers, who possess no pre-eminence over
judges as arbiters of public policy, the answer is that contracts entered into
by them stand in a somewhat different light. If such compacts are made
without constitutional or statutory sanction, express or implied, they are
Cf. Dodd, op. cit. supra note 24, at 6o2 et seq.
"Memphis & Charleston R. R. v. Gaines, 97 U. S.697 (i878) ; New Orleans v. New
Orleans W. W. Co., 142 U. S. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. i42 (i89i) ; Keokuk & Western R. R. v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 301, 14 Sup. Ct. 592 (1884); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. R. v. Adams, i8o
U. S. i, 21 Sup. Ct. 40 (igoi) ; Gulf &,Ship Island R. R. v. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66, 22 Sup.
Ct. 26 (igoi).

Aspinwall v. Daviess County, snpra~note 17.
Zane v. Hamilton County, supra note 20.
Detroit United Ry. v. Detroit, supra note 20.
San Antonio Trac. Co. v. Altgelt, 200 U. S. 304, 26 Sup. Ct. 261 (igoo) ; Puget Sound
Trac. Lt. & Pow. Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U. S. 574. 37 Sup. Ct. 7o5 (917) ; San Antonio v.
San Antonio Pub. Serv. Co., 255 U S. 547, 41 Sup. Ct. 428 (1921).
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ineffective, not because of any theories of public policy but because they are
ultravires; if they have such sanction, then they are as though they emanated
directly from the policy determining bodies. In the first case public policy
is an unnecessary weapon with which to kill them; in the second case it is
useless and unavailing. We may repeat: the public policy that lays low a
state contract must be a federal policy.
One case seems to furnish an example of illegality based upon federal
public policy. Mississippi, while the ports of the Confederacy were under
blockade during the Civil War, issued "cotton notes" on the security of
cotton pledged for their repayment when the blockade should be lifted.
These "cotton notes" were made receivable in payment of taxes due the
state and its subdivisions. At the close of the war, Mississippi's reconstruction legislature repealed this provision and it was held that the repeal did
not violate the contract clause. 32 The reasoning of the Court was to the
effect that the notes, inasmuch as they were issued "against the public
policy and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, are, therefore, illegal and void." 83 Here we have a very definite declaration of a
federal public policy overriding and avoiding what otherwise would be a
contractual agreement on the part of the State of Mississippi. The obvious
purpose of this legislation was to aid in the support of the government of
Mississippi and hence to advance the cause of the Confederacy. Such an
act and the contract it contained was therefore invalid as in contravention
of the public policy of the United States which makes preservation ,' f the
Union a primary matter of concern.8 4
Another instance of federal policy supervening to nullify a state's attempt to contract seems to be furnished by People v. Commissioners of
Taxes and Assessments.'3 In this case a claim of impairment of the obligation of contract by repeal of a tax exemption statute was met by the reply
that the enactment was in contravention of the command of Congress that
national bank stock be taxed at no higher rate than that of state banks, and
for that reasoi was void. Here the overriding national policy arises from
a statutory provision.
In each of these cases, be it noted, the policy is one of statecraft, not
of expediency in the field of private law. Whether any federal rule in the
latter area could have effect to nullify state compacts seems doubtful. The
reluctance of the courts to exert such authority is illustrated by the repeated
decisions upholding contractual grants of monopolistic franchises,3 6 though
Taylor v. Thomas, 89 U. S. 479 (1875).
Ibid. at 486.
U See also Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454, 463 (1878).
'94 U. S. 415 (1878).
Bridge Proprietors v.Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 68 U. S. i16 (1864) ; The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U. S. 51 (1865) ; New Orleans Gas Lt. Co. v. Louisiana Lt. & Heat Prodg.
& Mfg. Co., 15 U. S. 65o, 6 Sup. Ct. 252 (1885); New Orleans Water Wks. Co. v. Rivers,
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there has been a suggestion that to be valid they must not continue for too
37
long a time.
Lack of Capacity in Other Party
Strictly speaking, cases of this sort do not come within the announced
scope of this article. Inability to contract here resides not in the state but
in the other party to the claimed contract. Nevertheless many cases of this
sort arise under the contract clause and inasmuch as they do present situations in which the state is without power to bind itself it seems proper to
note them here.
The most common example arises from the relation between the state
and its governmental subdivisions. The uniform holding is that no contractual obligation arises out of agreements between the state and these
subordinate units.3 8 While this result may be justified upon the ground
that the dispositions in question are not contractual in character, 3J it may
and has been rested also upon the proposition that the governmental subdivisions are incompetent to form contracts with the state.4 0 On the whole
this seems a more satisfactory way in which to look at those cases involving
matters, such as tax exemptions, 4 1 grants of franchise, 4 2 water rights

43. or

land titles,4" which would be regarded as of a contractual nature if granted
to private persons, natural or artificial.
Of a kindred nature but of much less practical importance is the suggestion of Mr. Justice McKinley in Pollard v. Hagan45 that "an express
stipulation . . . granting the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent

domain to the United States" over land within the confines of a state'would
be "void and inoperative; because the United States has no constitutional
capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain,
115 U. S.674, 6 Sup. Ct.

273

(1885) ; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683,

6 Sup. Ct. 265 (1885). Cf. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 36 (1873) refusing to invalidate such a contract on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
* See Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry., 161 U. S. 646, 675, 16 Sup. Ct. .705, 714 (1896).
,sEast Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., supra note I4; Aspinwall v. Daviess County,
supra note 17; Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, IOO U. S. 514 (188o) ; Cape Girardeau County
Court v. Hill, 118 U. S. 68 (1886) ; Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U S. 189, 9 Sup. Ct.
483 (1889); Essex Pub. Road Bd. v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334, 11 Sup. Ct. 790 (i8gi); New
Orleans v. New Orleans W. W. Co., 142 U. S. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. 142 (891) ; Covington v.
Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231, I Sup. Ct. 383 (1899) ; Attorney General v. Lowrey, i99 U. S.
233, 26 Sup. Ct. 27 (i9o5) ; Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239 U. S. 254, 36 Sup. Ct.
58 (191.5); Pawhuska v. Pawhuska 0. & G. Co., 250 U. S. 394, 39 Sup. Ct. 526 (1919);
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 43 Sup. Ct. 534 (1923).
The foundation of the doctrine seems to rest on dicta by Marshall, C. J., and Story, J., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. 518, 629, 694 (1819).
See Eat Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., suora note 14, at 533; Mount Pleasant v.
Beckwith, IOO U. S. 514, 524 (1880).
0
' See Aspinwall v. Daviess County, supra note 17, at 377.
Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231, 19 Sup. Ct. 383 (899).
"East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., supra note 14.
'Trenton v. New Jersey, suPra note 38.
" Essex Pub. Road Bd. v. Skinkle, supra note 38.
'44 U. S. 212 (1845).
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within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is
expressly granted". 40 The learned justice would of course count as within
his exception the power to "exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over all

Places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockYards, and other needful Buildings," 4T granted to Congress by the Constitution. Aside from this the matter would seem to be of little practical
importance for it is most difficult to conceive of a state undertaking by compact to cede any of its general governmental powers to the nation other than
through the ordinary process of constitutional amendment. Federal aid
legislation of course does not in any way raise this problem, since the states
do not agree to suspend their governmental discretion in return for national
subventions.

4

9

Contracts in a Proprietary Capacity
The distinction between powers proprietary and powers governmental
bulks large in our public law, particularly in respect to municipal corporations. In concrete application the two concepts at times prove difficult to
discriminate, yet it will be admitted that they furnish a most valuable pair
of tools for dealing with certain types of juristic problems. Particularly is
this true in the field with which this inquiry is concerned, for while the functions commonly termed governmental lie within the field of statecraft, where
retention of discretion and freedom of action are most important desiderata,
the proprietary functions resemble more the ordinary activities of individuals
in respect to which contractual capacity and stability might well be desired.
Accordingly we find a very strong tendency to uphold state compacts in this
field. The initial case which blocked a state's attempt to renege upon a
contract involved a sale of land 49 and to this day, almost without exception,
state contractual capacity, when unfettered by constitutional restrictions or
supervening public policy, has been upheld in the domain of proprietary
action.
Applications of the rule furnish a somewhat extended catalog. Grants
of property 50 or contracts to sell or dispose of property 51 frequently have
been before the courts and as frequently have been upheld. Neither may a
52
state withdraw from a contract to purchase.
"Ibid.

223.

U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8.
' Cf. Burdick, FederalAid Legislationt (1923) 8 CORN. L. Q. 324, 335-337.
"Fletcher v. Peck, supra note 4.
' Ibid.; Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U. S. 43 (1815) ; Pawlet v. Clarke, 13 U. S. 292 (1815);
Columbia Ry. G. & E. Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U. S.236, 43 Sup. Ct. 306 (1923).
IPennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct. 699 (1891) ; Houston & Tex.
Cent. Ry. v. Texas, 170 U. S.243, 18 Sup. Ct. 61o (1898); John P. King Mfg. Co. v.
Augusta, 277 U. S. 1oo, 48 Sup. Ct. 489 (1928).
'

0 Carondelet Canal & Nay. Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362, 34 Sup. Ct. 627 (1914);
Superior Water, Lt. & Pow. Co. v. Superior, 263 U. S. 125, 44 Sup. Ct. 82 (1923).
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A few cases deal with agreements concerning the conduct of state
owned enterprises. Thus in Curran v. Arkansas 11 a contract to maintain
unimpaired the capital of a state bank was upheld as against a subsequent
attempt to divert the fund to other purposes. In two instances bargains
not to erect or to operate municipal utilities have been preserved from violation,5 4 though there is at least some ground for argument that so valuable
a weapon against private utility rapacity and oppression should be preserved
inviolate from a too shortsighted alienation by myopic city fathers.
Very naturally state and municipal borrowing furnishes a substantial
grist for the obligation of contract mill. In the absence of constitutional
restriction it is clear that there is no ground for doubting the capacity of a
state or of its subdivisions to incur any debt that the legislature sees fit to
authorize. The anticipation of future revenue in this manner too long has
been an accepted prerogative of kings and of republics alike to encounter
any effective opposition from courts unaided by constitutional provisions.
And when the government borrows, it is treated by the courts like any
private debtor. As Mr. Justice Field remarked in Broughton v. Pensacola,5
"Although a municipal corporation, so far as it is invested with subordinate
legislative powers for local purposes, is a mere instrumentality of the State
for the convenient administration of government, yet, when authorized to
take stock in a railroad company, and issue its obligations in payments of the
stock, it is to that extent to be deemed a private corporation, and its obligations are secured by all the guarantees which protect the engagements of
private individuals." 51 The distinguished justice might have added that
the same is true of the state itself. 57 Accordingly we find decisions protecting bondholders against acts which would impair the means available for
the payment of their claims,5 8 against the imposition, of tax liens upon their
interest payments,5 9 or the displacement of security pledged for the satisfaction of the debt. 60
Another proprietary function is the power of financial management
involved in compromising claims against the state. Compromise agreements
056 U.

S. 304 (853).

"Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. I, io Sup. Ct. 77 (1898) ; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 2o2 U. S. 453, 26 Sup. Ct. 65o (19o6).
93 U. S. 266 (1876).
Ibid. 269.
"The truth is, States and cities, when they borrow money and contract to repay it with
interest, are not acting as sovereignties. They come down to the level of ordinary individuals.
Their contracts have the same meaning as that of similar contracts between private persons."
Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 445 (1878).
'Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U. S. 535 (1866) ; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266
(1876) ; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358 (i88o) ; Port of Mobile v. Watson, i6 U. S.
289, 6 Sup. Ct. 398 (1886) ; Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284, 7 Sup. Ct. 1190 (887) ; Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. S. 646, 17 Sup. Ct. 957 (1897); Graham v. Folsom, 2oo U. S.
248, 26 Sup. Ct. 245 (i9o6).
Murray v. Charleston, supra note 57.
' Wabash & Erie Canal Co. v. Beers, 67 U. S. 448 (1863) ; Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 53i (1876).
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have several times been enforced 61 and there seems no good reason to
question the capacity of a state to compromise where it could have contracted
in the first instance. It would seem, however, that the converse is equally
true, namely, that a contract which the state could not properly make will
not afford a proper basis for a compromise agreement. 6 2 But a settlement
of even such a claim, if consummated by payment, will be protected by the
contract clause.6 3
One limitation of general policy seems properly to exist in respect to
contracts in the field of proprietary functions. In Board of Liquidation v.
McComb 64 the Supreme Court upheld and enforced a contract setting apart
certain taxes for the payment of bonds of a specified issue as against subsequent legislation attempting to impose the payment of still other bonds
against this fund. The opinion contains this statement, however:
"We are not prepared to say that the legislature of a State can
bind itself, without the aid of a constitutional provision, not to create
a further debt, or not to issue any more bonds. Such an engagement
could hardly be enforced against an individual; and, when made on the
part of a State, it involves, if binding, a surrender of a prerogative
which might seriously affect the public safety. The right to procure
the necessary means of carrying on the government by taxation and
loans is essential to the political independence of every commonwealth." 65
Abdication, even in respect to the proprietary functions, may not be
permitted. There is a vital public interest in having government free to
act. To some extent this may be overridden by the desirability of stability
in ordinary business dealings with public bodies as with individuals. Hence
to a limited degree such compacts are enforced. But an utter surrender of
all power would impair governmental efficiency unduly and cannot be permitted. It seems extremely probable that this will apply to all contracts
under the so-called proprietary functions.
One other limitation should be noted. Contracts for the sale of trust
property 66 or for its disposition contrary to the terms of the trust 67 do not
bind the state. Whether in respect to such property the bona fide purchaser
' Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278 (1882) ; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 2 Sup.
Ct. 128 (1883); Ford v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 164 U. S. 662, i7 Sup. Ct. 230 (1897). Cf.
Terre Iaute & Indianapolis R. R. v. Indiana, 194 U. S. 579, 24 Sup. Ct. 767 (i9o4).
' This is indicated by Northern Cent. Ry. v. Maryland, 187 U. S. 258, 23 Sup. Ct. 62
(1902).

I-ouston & Tex. Cent. R. R. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 20 Sup. Ct. 545 (1900).
0192 U. S. 531 (1876).

SIbid. 535.
Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 13 Sup. Ct. 11o (1892) (submerged lands
under a navigable lake, conveyed in violation of trust for public use). Cf. Appleby v. New
York, 271 U. S. 364, 46 Sup. Ct. 569 (1926) (upholding and protecting a conveyance of similar land where no such public trust existed).
I Paup v. Drew, 51 U. S. 218 (185o) ; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, io Sup. Ct.
972 (igo).
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doctrine would be applied appears not to have received the Supreme Court's
attention. In each of the cases cited, the trust found embodiment either in
the constitutions or the public acts of the respective states, or in some common law rule of policy, of all of which the purchaser was bound to take
notice. 68 It is somewhat difficult to conceive of a governmental trust which
would not fall under one or the other of these classifications. The question
may therefore be not only moot but of no importance.
Contracts Affecting Public Revenue
The revenue assembling and preserving function presents features akin
to both the proprietary and the governmental functions of public administration. It is concerned with the collection and the preservation of the
state's income; to that extent it deserves classification with the activities
belonging to the former category. On the other hand, the revenue forms
the life blood of the state from which must be drawn the necessary vigor
for the carrying out of all the governmental functions; to that extent judicial
as well as political and administrative attitudes toward it must take into
account the factors which condition public policy in respect to functions of
the latter class.
In view of this one would be quite prepared to find a somewhat stricter
attitude displayed toward contracts affecting the public revenue than toward
those with which we have heretofore dealt. The serious consequences to
governmental efficiency and to the ideal of equal distribution of the tax
burden which lurk in the recognition of this field as affording legitimate
scope for the exercise of the bargaining power might well lead to a denial
thereof or to the imposition of extreme restrictions. However the Supreme
Court has not taken this view, but on the contrary has been quite liberal.
In the earliest case involving a tax exemption agreement, New Jersey
v. Wilson,69 the court seemed not at all aware that there was any question
as to the power of a state to bargain away immunity from contribution to
its support. After reviewing the negotiations between New Jersey and the
Delaware Indians culminating in the grant to the latter of a tax-free reservation, John Marshall laconically said, "Every requisite to the formation of
a contract is to be found in the proceedings between the then colony of New
Jersey and the Indians."

70

Eighteen years later, when next the matter

engaged his attention, he recognized difficulties and, without deciding that
such a grant could not be made, applied a rule of strict construction against
those claiming its existence.7 1 There the matter rested and did not come up
again until after his death.
" Neblett v. Barron, i6o S. W. 1167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
ii U. S. 164 (1812).
Ibid. 166.

"That the taxing power is of vital importance; that it is essential to the existence of
government; are truths which it cannot be necessary to reaffirm. . . . It would seem, that
71
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In 1845 an agreement to exempt certain bonds from taxation in return
for the construction of a road and for payments to the school fund was held
to be a contract whose obligation might not be impaired 72 with little or no
discussion of its propriety, but in i855 the first of the long line of Ohio
tax exemption cases presented a more difficult nut to crack. The decision
was in favor of the validity of the tax exemption contract 73 but three
judges, Catron, Daniel and Campbell, dissented. The main argument
against the power seems to have been based on the claim that it was a surrender of sovereignty 74 and it was to that argument that Mr. Justice
McLean, speaking for the court, chiefly addressed himself, by arguing that
75
to make such a bargain is in reality an exercise of sovereignty.
Other contemporaneous cases were decided in the same way.76 But
opposition was not stilled and arose again, through the voice of Mr. Justice
Miller, in the more tenable objection that the prevailing view really sanctioned a draining of the life blood of the state.77 The majority remained
inflexible, however, and rejoined to Miller's argument that the watchfulness
of the people must be depended on to prevent the state from becoming felo
de se.7 11 The result has been that the advocates of the power to contract for
tax exemptions have decisively gained the day. A long line of decisions
79
attests the sweeping character of their victory.
the relinquishment of such a power is never to be presumed. We will not say, that a state
may not relinquish it; that a consideration sufficiently valuable to induce a partial release of
it, may not exist; but as the whole community is interested in retaining it undiminished; that
community has a right to insist, that its abandonment ought not to be presumed, in a case in
which the deliberate purpose of the state to abandon it does not appear." Providence Bank
v. Billings, 29 U. S. 514, 56i (i83o).

I Gordon v. Appeal Tax Ct., 44 U. S. 133 (845).
"Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, supra note 7.
7, See for a discussion of this general theory, mtpra p. 641, in this article.
"This act, so far from parting with any portion of the sovereignty, is an exercise of it.
Can any one deny this power to the legislature? Has it not a right to select the objects of
taxation and determine the amount? To deny either of these, is to take away State sovereignty." Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, supranote 7, at 389.
"Dodge v. Woolsey, 85 U. S. 331 (1855) ; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U. S.
436 (1862) ; McGee v. Mathis, 71 U. S. 143 (i866).
S"To hold, then, that any one of the annual legislatures can, by contract, deprive the
State forever of the power of taxation, is to hold that they can destroy the government
which they are appointed to serve, and that their action in that regard is strictly lawful."
Miller, J., dissenting in Washington University v. Rouse, 75 U. S. 439, 443 (1869).
"It may be conceded that it were better for the interest of the State, that the taxing
power, which is one of the highest and most important attributes of sovereignty, should on
no occasion be surrendered. In the nature of things the necessities of the government cannot always be foreseen, and in the changes of time, the ability to raise revenue from every
species of property may be of vital importance to the State, but the courts of the country are
not the proper tribunals to apply the corrective to improvident legislation of this character.
If there be no constitutional restraint on the action of the legislature on this subject, there
is no remedy, except through the influence of a wise public sentiment, reaching and controlling the conduct of the law-making power." Wilmington R. R. v. Reid, 8o U. S. 264, 267
(1872).
1 Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U. S. 430 (I869); Tomlinson v. Branch, 82 U S.
46o (1873); Wilmington R. R. v. Reid, 8o U. S. 264 (1872); Humphrey v. Pegues, 83 U. S.
244 (1873); Pacific R. R. v. Maguire, 87 U. S. 36 (1874) ; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104
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From the standpoint of statecraft, oft said to be the dominant consideration in administering the broad provisions of the Constitution, the
balance appears to hang on the side of the minority. Inequality in taxation,
child of tax exemptions, inevitably brings dissatisfaction and resentment.
That a power to contract to accomplish these results should be recognized in
this field seems unfortunate. In addition, exemptions, if carried too far,
may seriously handicap needed fiscal reform, may impair the revenues beyond the point of safety. The Court has recognized that complete surrender
of the taxing function would not be upheld. "No government dependent
on taxation for support can bargain away its whole power of taxation, for
that would be substantially abdication." 80 However, these words seem
likely to bear but little fruit in the form of decision. No government will
grant a general moratorium on taxes, and it seems that it is only to such a
general moratorium that this language is meant to apply. Perpetual, at
least unlimited, individual tax exemptions have received approval and protection from the Court since the earliest case with no indication that at any
time would they be deemed to have expired."' The hope has been expressed
that eventually the Court may recognize the force of the objections to making
the taxing power the subject of bargain and sale and overrule the long line
of cases approving the practice. 2 But the decisions to date give little
encouragement to this view.
Closely akin to tax exemptions are those arrangements by which states
agree to receive bank notes or their own bonds and coupons in payment of
taxes due. The Court uniformly has held these to constitute contracts between the states and those who take the paper in question and by protecting
them against impairment has recognized the competence of the states to
make them, 3 a ruling entirely consistent with its stand on tax exemption
agreements.
Public or Governmental Functions in General
For obvious reasons one would be prepared to accede to a general proposition that "the power of governing is a trust committed by the people to
99 U. S. 309
U. S. 362 (1882); Powers v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry.,

(1877) ; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679 (1878); University v. People,

(1879) ; Asylum v. New Orleans,

105

201 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. 556 (1906) ; Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup.
Ct. 432 (1929).

o Stone v. Mississippi, IOI U. S. 814, 820 (1879).
Jersey v. Wilson, ii U. S. 164 (1812) and Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts,
supra note 79, the first and the last of the tax exemption cases, both exemplify the enforcement of agreements unlimited in point of time.
'New

' See BuRIICK, TiE LAW OF THE AmERICAN CONSTITUTION (I922) 470.
' Cases relating to bank notes: Woodruff v. Trapnall, 51 U. S. 19o (x85o) ; Furman v.

Nichol, 75 U. S. 44 (I869) ; State v. Stoll, 84 U. S. 425 (1873) ; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S.
454 (1878). Cases relating to state bonds and coupons thereof: Hartman v. Greenhow, 1O2
U. S. 672 (1881) ; Antoni v. Greenhow, 1O7 U. S. 769, 2 Sup. Ct. 91 (1883) ; Poindexter v.
Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. 9o3, 962 (188.5) ; Royall v. Virginia, 116 U. S. 572, 6
Sup. Ct. 510 (1886) ; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, IO Sup. Ct. 972 (189o).
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the government, no part of which can be granted away," S4 and that "The
contracts which the Constitution protects are those that relate to property
rights, not governmental." 85 But in spite of judicial language to that
effect, the decisions clearly show that no such broad and easy test has been
applied in the past to the solution of cases wherein litigants claimed to
bind governance by contract nor do they indicate that it will be given a
general and undeviating application in the future. It seems better therefore to subject the cases relating to this problem to a somewhat detailed
analysis.
The question was early mooted concerning compacts between the nation
and the states. In availing itself of the constitutional permission that "New
States may be admitted by the Conkress into this Union" s6 the national
legislature repeatedly has exacted as a condition to the act of admittance
that the new state consent to be bound by terms and conditions dictated by
Congress.8 The validity of a compact between state and nation, whether
at the time of admission or later, seems unquestioned if the subject matter
falls within the domain of the proprietary powers, 8 in accordance with
principles heretofore discussed s and the same has been held in respect to
an agreement concerning taxation,90 which we have seen to be governed by
principles analogous to those applied to the proprietary functions. 91 As
early as 1845, however, it was decided that an agreement on the part of the
inhabitants of a newly admitted state "that they forever disclaim all right
and title to the waste or unappropriated lands lying within the same territory; and that the same shall be and remain at the sole and entire disposition
of the United States" was effective only so far as to reserve title to such
lands in the national government and did not operate to give Congress any
power to determine rules of property within the new state. 92 The Court
even went so far as to say that the agreement as to title "cannot operate as
a contract between the parties, but is binding as a law", 0 3 a position that
94
probably would not be maintained today.
" See Stone v. Mississippi, 1I U. S. 814, 820 (1879).
6 Ibid.
I U. S. CoNsT., Art. IV, § 3.
'See WLOUGHBY, THE AmEmicAN CONSTITuTIONAL SYSTEM (1904) 265-266.
'McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143 (U. S. 1866) (grant of swamp lands to state by Congress).
'See supra p. 647, in this article.
I Steams v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 21 Sup. Ct.73 (1900).
'See supra p. 650, in this article.
'Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 212 (1845).
w Ibid. 224, per McKinley, J. He goes on to say, "Full power is given to Congress 'to
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the
United States.' This authorized the passage of all laws necessary to secure the rights of
the United States to the public lands, and to provide for their sale, and to protect them from
taxation."
" See cases cited supra notes 88, go.
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In Withers v. Buckley " the Court said of a provision in the Mississippi
enabling act stipulating for freedom of navigation on the Mississippi River
and its tributaries that "it could have no effect to restrict the new State in
any of its necessary attributes as an independent sovereign Government, nor
to inhibit or diminish its perfect equality with the other members of the
Confederacy with which it was to be associated." 96 It remained for the
Twentieth Century, however, to bring this doctrine to full fruition when, in
Coyle v. Smith,9 7 the Supreme Court refused to allow binding effect to the
attempt of Congress to stipulate with Oklahoma as to the location of the
Sooner State's seat of government. There, in a lucid and well-reasoned
opinion by Mr. Justice Lurton, the inability of the federal government to
exact agreements concerning governmental matters from new states as the
price of admission was explained as resulting from the implied condition
that, since the original union was composed of states co-equal in power, the
new states to be admitted to "this Union" must necessarily be equal in power
to their elder sisters. Hence Congress may not impose upon them limitations which will bind or restrict the exercise of governmental power by
them to an extent not applicable to all other states of the union."
This reason of course applies only to exactions attempted at the granting of statehood. It leaves open to question whether Congress could strike
a bargain with a state after admission as to the exercise of governmental
power. Apparently no case has directly dealt with the problem. A dictum
in Pollardv. Hagan 99 suggests that an attempted transfer of state governmental power to the nation would be void because of incapacity on the part
of the grantee to exercise such power. A similar line of reasoning would
appear to stand in the way of an agreement by the state to exercise its governmental powers in a specific way. Our dual organization of government,
with its distribution of powers between state and nation, contemplates that
the states shall within their own field exercise full discretion in matters of
government except as limited by the Constitution. Any agreement undertaking to bind that discretion would contravene this fundamental policy.
Hence while states may follow certain policies because of a desire to cooperate with national authority or in order to earn federal subventions or
for any other reason, it is believed that they cannot bind themselves to do
so and that the Supreme Court will not give effect to such an agreement.
A distinction is to be drawn in this respect between contracts of a state
with the nation on the one hand and contracts of a state with another state
on the other hand. In the latter situation it is apparently no objection to
61 U. S. 84 (1858).
92. See also
113, 116 (1887).
'Ibid.

Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co.,

S. 559, 31 Sup. Ct. 688 (i9ii).
Ibid. at 567, 31 Sup. Ct. at 69o.
Supra note 92, at 223.

9221 U.

123

U. S. 288, 296, 8 Sup. Ct.
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the binding force of the agreement that it relates to matters governmental.
For example, in Green v. Biddle 100 an agreement between Virginia and
Kentucky was held to prevent the latter state from enacting a law relating
to the rights of occupying claimants in ejectment suits; surely an exercise
of governmental discretion if ever there was one. The basis for this distinction seems to lie in the different relation of the contracting parties to
each other. As we have suggested, state and nation are welded together
in a constitutional scheme of organization which allots different powers to
each. Pacts between them concerning matters governmental would tend to
alter this scheme by an extra-constitutional method. On the other hand,
as to each other and as to matters within their own competence, the states
occupy somewhat the position of independent powers. 10 1 International
agreements binding the exercise of governmental functions are common and
legitimate. There seems no reason why interstate agreements should not
be valid, subject only to the constitutional requirement that pacts of a
0
political nature be approved by Congress.1

2

Contracts with individuals in respect to governmental structure and
organization have had a somewhat varied treatment. An agreement for
the location of a county seat has been held not binding 103 on the ground
of the public interest in free and untrammeled legislative discretion over
such matters. 10 4 A fortiori a dictum to the same effect concerning the site
of a state capital seems sound.' 0° Admitting that the powers and authorities
of public officers could not be the subject of contract, Mr. Justice Story, in
the Dartmouth College case, nevertheless voiced the opinion that an official
salary could not be reduced within the officer's term.' 06 When the point
0'
was definitely presented to the Court, however, in Butler v. Pennsylvaania,
the decision was against the officer's claim to contractual protection both

10 21 U. S. 1

0I823).

.0.
See Buckner v. Finley, 27 U. S. 586, s9o (1829).
'The Constitution in general terms requires all interstate compacts to have congressional consent. U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, § 1O. By interpretation, however, this is held applicable only to agreements tending to increase state political power or influence. Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 13 Sup. Ct. 728 (1893). See Donovan, State Compacts as a
Method of Settling Problems Common to Several States (1931) 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 5.
Newton v. Commissioners, IO U. S. 548 (1879).

"This must necessarily be so in the nature of things. It is vital to the public welfare
that each one should be able at all times to do whatever the varying circumstances and present
exigencies touching the subject involved may require. A different result would be fraught
with evil." Newton v. Commissioners, supra note io3, at 559.
1

'

Newton v. Commissioners, supra note lO3, at 56o.

""But when the legislature makes a contract with a public officer, as in the case of a
stipulated salary for his services, during a limited period, this, during the limited period, is
just as much a contract, within the purview of the constitutional prohibition, as a like contract would be between two private citizens. Will it be contended that the legislature of a
state can diminish the salary of a judge, holding his office during good behaviour? Such an
authority has never yet been asserted to our knowledge." Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
i7 U. S. 5x8, 693 (I819). Cf. Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U. S. 99, 10 Sup. Ct. 431
(i89o) where the court seems to have assumed that the obligation of contract clause applies
to congressional action.
''5I U. S. 402 (1850).
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for the tenure and for the emoluments of his office. Said Mr. Justice
Daniel:
"The contracts designed to be protected by the tenth section of
the first article of that instrument [the Constitution] are contracts by
which perfect rights, certain definite, fixed private rights of property,
are vested. These are clearly distinguishable from measures or engagements adopted or undertaken by the body politic or State government
for the benefit of all, and from the necessity of the case, and according
to universal understanding, to be varied or discontinued as the public
good shall require. The selection of officers, who are nothing more
than agents for the effectuating of such public purposes, is a matter of
public convenience or necessity, and so too are the periods for the
appointment of such agents; but neither the one nor the other of these
arrangements can constitute any obligation to continue such agents, or
to reappoint them, after the measures which brought them into being,
shall have been found useless, shall have been fulfilled, or shall have
been abrogated as even detrimental to the well-being of the public. The
promised compensation for services actually performed and accepted,
during the continuance of the particular agency, may undoubtedly be
claimed, both upon principles of compact and of equity; but to insist
beyond this on the perpetuation of a public policy either useless or
detrimental, and upon a reward for acts neither desired nor performed,
would appear to be reconcilable with neither common justice nor common sense. The establishment of such a principle would arrest necessarily everything like progress or improvement in government; or if
changes should be ventured upon, the government would have to become one great pension establishment on which to quarter a host of
sinecurists." 108
1

The considerations of policy set forth in this opinion seem unanswerable
and it is believed, if a distinction may be drawn between officers on the one
hand and agents or independent contractors on the other, that it represents
settled law. Upon the basis of such a distinction, two decisions holding
invalid impairment agreements with employees of the latter class may be
supported. 10 9 Contractors with the state are not regarded as its officers or
instrumentalities in such a sense as to exempt them from federal income
taxation upon their salaries, 110 and it does not seem that their services rank
high enough in the scale of state policy to embarrass seriously the conduct
of public affairs if their agreements with the state are held to be enforcible.
Even in the case of persons in the officer class the court gives contractual
protection to the obligation to pay the stipulated sum for services once they
" Ibid. 416.
'Hall
v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5 (1886) (one hired under legislative authorization to
conduct a state geological survey for a specied time) ; Mississippi v. Miller, 276 U. S. 174, So
Sup. Ct. 40 (I928)(tax collector's contract to press suits for back taxes on percentage basis).
Cf. Head v. The University, 86 U. S. 526 (1874) (agreement interpreted as subject to modification).
'Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172 (1926).
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are performed. The state may not by subsequent legislation impair the
obligation to pay or the substantial remedies for enforcing that protection.1 1 '
State Contracts and the Police Power
The cases concerning agreements with private persons to surrender or
limit the free exercise of the police or regulatory power of government are
so numerous and so devious in their implications that it seems better to
segregate them for treatment under a separate division of this article,
although logically they should be grouped under the general heading of
contracts affecting governmental functions.
A large part of the confusion and ambiguity which plagues all students
of the police power decisions in constitutional law is due to a tendency to
treat that power as a mysteriously separate and distinct manifestation of
governmental authority. It has been well said that "Judges and lawyers
need to recollect constantly that the police power is not an entity." 112 Nevertheless it is just that which is forgotten in the common statement, too
stereotyped to require citation or quotation, that a particular governmental
act is unconstitutional unless it may be justified under the police power, as
though this same police power were some divinely mysterious governmental
attribute, of superior rank to the Constitution itself. The truth of course is,
as Judge Hastings so well demonstrates," 3 that the term police power when
coupled with the word state was originally employed to designate the
residuum of governmental powers left to the states after subtracting that
delegated to the national jurisdiction and has continued to have that significance on eve-y occasion when subjected to thorough analysis. So construed
and so applied it becomes nothing more nor less than, in the luminous phrase
of Chief Justice Taney, "the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions . . . the power to govern men
and things .
" 114 Hence when one speaks of a contract to alienate or
to restrict the police power what is really meant is a contract to restrict or
to alienate the governing or regulating power for which "the police power is
but another name." 115
The view that there are some limits to the validity of stipulations to
surrender or to limit governing power appears fairly early in the Supreme
m
Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 1i6 U. S. 131, 6 Sup. Ct. 329 (1885) ; Louisiana v.
New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 30 Sup. Ct. 40 09o9). Mississippi v. Miller, supra note iog,
apparently is regarded by the court as belonging in that class, but even under the liberal innovation contained in CONTRACTS RESTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 45, it seems impossible
to regard the tax ferret's compensation as being fully earned when the law governing his
compensation was modified. It therefore appears better to regard the case as giving the tax
ferret the status of an independent contractor, which may well be done.
I See HASTINGS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE DEcIsiows

RELATING TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE (1900)

xn See ibid. passim.
n4 The License Cases, 46 U. S. 504, 583 (1847).
"" See

Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell,

222

U.

S.

191.

225, 233, 32 Sup. Ct. 74, 75 (1911).
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Court Reports, though it received but little sympathy from the court in
ante-bellum days. In part the argument was based on the alleged inalienability of sovereignty, heretofore discussed.'- 6 On other occasions the argument assumed more modem form. As early as 1821 John Marshall suggested that a municipal corporation "cannot abridge its own legislative
power." 117 The case went off on another point and in any event the capacity
of a municipality to contract away its delegated powers, in the absence of
express legislative authority therefore, might well be regarded with a narrower vision than that with which the similar acts of a general legislative
body, unhampered by constitutional limitations, would be viewed. But the
idea thus given judicial cognizance was to reappear.""
It was expressed at greater length and in language much like that
which eventually secured judicial approval in the argument by Mr. Hazzard
in the tax exemption case of ProvidenceBank v. Billings." 9 He contended:
"It is not wholesome doctrine for private corporations to imbibe,
that they are independent of the power that creates them; and that
they shall be protected in setting it at defiance. Not only are their
franchises and other property subject to the taxing power of states;
but, so far as the public interests are affected by the action of a corporation, so far those operations must be under the control of government, whose province and paramount duty, it is to provide for the
public welfare. Thus, should the public good require the suppression
of a paper currency, certainly the government would have a right to
suppress it although, in so doing, they would destroy the banks whose
paper composes that currency. It will not do to say that a chartered
military company may not be put down, or, that a chartered company
engaged in supplying a city with water, or any such corporations, may
not be suppressed, if the government should see good cause for suppressing them; and, in point of character, there is no difference between
those corporations and banking corporations whose paper bills constitute the public money currency of the country." 120
A little later he states still more explicitly the doctrine of the inalienability
of the governing power:
a See supra p. 641, in this article.
= See Goszler v. Georgetown, supra note 7.
It has been suggested that the doctrine of the inalienability of police power may be
traced two years earlier to the dictum of Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, supra note 14, at 629. "That the framers of the Constitution did not intend
to restrain the states in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal
government, and that the instrument they have given us, is not to be so construed, may
be admitted." See Denny, The Growth and Development of the Police Power of the State
(1921) 20 MIcn. L. REv. 173, 183. But to me at least this statement, read in its context, refers to the organization of subordinate governmental units and other public agencies and instrnmentalities rather than to agreements by the state concerning the exercise of regulatory
power.
29 U. S. 514 (1830).
Ibid. 547.
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"There is another question, a most important one, which must
always present itself in a case like the present. That question is,
whether any legislature can, if it would, grant or surrender any portion
of that power of which sovereignty itself consists? . . . [He then
speaks of cases upholding executed property grants against legislative
impairment.] But such grants and contracts, it appears, are very
different from an alienation, in perpetuity, of a portion of the taxing
power of the state; which, in another case, this court declared to be
'an incident of sovereignty', and 'essential to the existence of government'.
"There are certain powers which are inherent in the people, and
cannot be alienated, even by the people themselves, much less by their
representatives, to whom those powers are entrusted for a time; not to
be annihilated, but to be exercised by them, until other representatives
shall be appointed in their places." 121
The case was decided upon a construction of the charter as not undertaking to confer the exemption claimed by the bank, so that again the point
was evaded.
The doctrine assumed more definite form still in the argument of Mr.
22
Greenleaf in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge."Among the powers of government, which are essential to the
constitution and well-being of civil society, are, not only the power of
taxation, and providing for the common defense, but that of providing
safe and convenient ways for the public necessity and convenience; and
the right of taking property for public use. .

.

. They are intrusted

to the legislature, to be exercised, not bartered away; and it is indispensable that each legislature should assemble, with the same measure
of sovereign power, that was held by its predecessors." 128
The argument was rejected vigorously by Justice Story, dissenting; 124
and by Justice McLean, concurring, 125 while the case itself once more went
off on a point of interpretation, leaving the doctrine still without definite
judicial approval.

A dictum indicative of a view that ".

.

. powers and

obligations by which governments are enabled, and are called upon, to foster
and promote the general good . . ." are so important that ".

.

. govern-

ments cannot be presumed to have surrendered, if indeed they can under
any circumstances be justified in surrendering them",'1 26 and an express refusal to decide upon a contention by counsel in another case "That one
legislature cannot restrain, control or bargain away the power of future
Ibid. 548.
=36 U. S. 42o (837).
Ibid. 466.
22

Ibid. 643.

SBIbid.568.
'See
Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U. S. 402, 417 (1850).
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legislatures to authorize public improvements for the benefit of the
people," 127 terminate the record of the attention given by the court to this
problem in pre-Civil War days.
In the second decade following the War the question came up with
renewed importance. The profligacy with which the reconstruction legislatures in the South had bartered away the public welfare and an awakening
sensitiveness at the North to social advancement as against the claims of
vested rights united in presenting to the court a series of cases in which
the expediency of sustaining contracts limiting the exercise of regulatory
power appeared in a most unfavorable aspect.
The first case was Boyd v. Alabama.128 There the Alabama legislature
had chartered a lottery by an act which the state Supreme Court held to be
void under the Alabama Constitution. Hence under principles already discussed 129 there was no binding contract to be impaired by the subsequent
act of repeal. In delivering the opinion of the court to that effect Mr.
Justice Field, not usually regarded as a judicial liberal, added that "We are
not prepared to admit that it is competent for one legislature, by any contract with an individual, to restrain the power of a subsequent legislature
to legislate for the public welfare, and to that end suppress any and all
practices tending to corrupt the public morals",1 30 citing two state cases in
which the inalienability of the police power had then recently been asserted.1 31
The next year, after upholding a Massachusetts prohibition act against
the claim that it impaired the obligation of the charter contract of a brewery
on the ground of a reserved power to repeal, Mr. Justice Bradley proceeded
to say that even had there been no such reservation the legislature would
not have been bound by its predecessor's acts to permit the manufacture of
13 2
beer until the expiration of the charter.
In 1879 came the decision foreshadowed by these dicta. A Mississippi
legislature had chartered a lottery for a term of years. The next year a
new state constitution outlawed the business. The Supreme Court upheld
the outlawry,1 33 Chief Justice Waite speaking in vigorous terms:
etc. R. R. v. Louisa R. R., 54 U. S. 71 (1851).
U.Richmond
S.645 (1877).
' Supra p. 642, in this article.
'o Supra note 128, at 65o.
v. State, 48 Miss. I47 (1873) ; Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34
'Moore
N. Y. 657 (i866).
' "Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries of the
police power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory definition of it, there
seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the protection of the lives, health, and property
of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and public morals. The legislature
cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the power to provide for these objects. They belong
emphatically to that class of objects which demand the application of the maxim, salus populi
suprema lex; and they are to be attained and provided for by such appropriate means as the
legislative discretion may devise. That discretion can no more be bargained away than the
power itself." Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 33 (1878).
' Stone v. Mississippi, 1oi U. S. 814 (1879).
'See
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"No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public
morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants.
The supervision of both these subjects of governmental power is continuing in its nature, and they are to be dealt with as the special
exigencies of the moment may require. Government is organized with
a view to their preservation, and cannot divest itself of the power to
provide for them. For this purpose the largest legislative discretion
is allowed, and
the discretion cannot be parted with any more than the
13 4
power itself.
"But the power of governing is a trust committed by the people
to the government, no part of which can be granted away. The people,
in their sovereign capacity, have established their agencies for the
preservation of the public health and the public morals, and the protection of public and private rights. These several agencies can govern
according to their discretion, if within the scope of their general authority, while in power; but they cannot give away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after them, in respect to matters the
government of which, from the very nature of things, must 'vary with
varying circumstances.'"

185

"The contracts which the Constitution protects are those that relate to property rights, not governmental." 136
Upon similar reasoning the repeal by Louisiana of a monopoly to main137
tain slaughterhouses at New Orleans was upheld.
But the sweeping principle that no part of the public trust of governing
is subject to alienation by contract was not to go unchallenged. A warning
note was sounded in the slaughterhouse decision when Justice Miller asserted that "we are not prepared to say that the legislature can make valid
contracts on no subject embraced in the largest definition of the police
power." 13s The suggestion was translated into decision in 1885 and 1887
when monopolies of gas 139 and of water supply 140 were upheld against
Ibid. 8i9.

Ibid. 820.
Ibid. 82o. Of course a state constitution may place such things in the field of conHouston v. New Orleans, i19 U. S. 26., 7 Sup. Ct. 198 (1886).
"The preservation of these [the public health and the public morals] is so necessary
best interests of social organization that a wise policy forbids the legislative body to
itself of the power to enact laws for the preservation of health and the repression of

tract.
"
to the
divest
crime.
"It cannot be permitted that, when the constitution of a State, the fundamental law of
the land, has imposed upon its legislature the duty of guarding, by suitable laws, the health of
its citizens, especially in crowded cities, and the protection of their person and property by
suppressing and preventing crime, that the power which enables it to perform this duty, can
be sold, bargained away, under any circumstances, as if it were a mere privilege which the
legislator could dispose of at his pleasure." Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse etc. Co. v.
Crescent City Live Stock Landing etc. Co., III U. S. 746, 751, 4 Sup. Ct. 652, 654 (1884).
Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse etc. Co. v. Crescent City Live Stock Landing etc.
Co., mPra note 137, at 760, 4 Sup. Ct. at 654.
' New Orleans Gas Lt. Co. v. Louisiana Lt. & Heat Prodg. & Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 65o,
6 Sup. Ct. 252 (1885).
110St. Tammany Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 12o U. S. 64, 7

Sup. Ct. 405 (1887).
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subsequent repeal. The Court undertook to draw a distinction between
the police power in its broadest sense and the narrower police power concerned only with protecting the public health and the public morals. Only
in this narrower sense, it was declared, was police power inalienable and
even then to no greater degree than was absolutely necessary to accomplish
these purposes. Thus complete repeal of a charter grant would be upheld
only if the business however conducted involved danger to health or morals;
in other cases the power of regulation alone must be relied upon to protect
these interests.

141

The suggested limitation was not without authoritative support. The
Dartmouth College case itself involved the exercise of regulatory power in
the supervision of education 142 and the various attempts to abolish monopoly
grants in respect to bridges and ferries which uniformly had been defeated 143 could be regarded as undertaken in aid of the general welfare.
Nevertheless these cases had been decided before judicial recognition of the
public policy against limiting governmental discretion by contract had occurred and it might well have been determined that they became obsolete
when the new principle was recognized.
More recently judicial language has reverted strongly to the broad
position of inalienability of all police power. It seems to have started in
1896 when, in holding that the charter power of a railroad to purchase a
parallel line did not prevent a subsequent prohibition of the consolidation
of parallel and competing lines, the court said, "While the police power has
been most frequently exercised with respect to matters which concern the
public health, safety or morals, we have frequently held that corporations
engaged in a public service are subject to legislative control, so far as it
becomes necessary for the protection of the public interests."

144

Later

pronouncements have been even more specific:
"For it is settled that neither the 'contract' clause nor the 'due
process' clause has the effect of overriding the power of the State to
establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the
health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away,
and is inalienable even by express grant; and that all contract and
property rights are held subject to its fair exercise." 145
" New Orleans Gas Lt. Co. v. Louisiana Lt. & Heat Prodg. & Mfg. Co., supra note 139,
at 669, 6 Sup. Ct. at 262.
' Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. 518 (,8,9).
' See cases cited supra note 36.
'" Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Kentucky, 16I U. S. 677, 695, 16 Sup. Ct. 714, 721
(1896).

Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558, 34 Sup. Ct. 364, 368
An identical line of reasoning may be found in Chicago & Alton R. R. v. Tranbarger,
238 U. S. 67, 76, 3.5 Sup. Ct. 678, 682 (915).
To the same effect see Denver & Rio Grande
R. R. v. Denver, 25o U. S. 241, 243, 39 Sup. Ct. 450, 451 (919).
'

(914).
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When one turns from words to decisions it becomes at once apparent that
neither of these two theories is consistently followed by the Supreme Court.
Instead there is a curious preservation of both as the ground of decision in
cases roughly contemporaneous down to the present hour. A large number
of the decisions wherein the existence of binding contracts has been denied
are clearly explainable upon the ground that the powers claimed to be contracted away involved the public health, safety or morals. 146 At least one
of these cases advances the broad doctrine of the inalienability of all police
power.147 At the extreme opposite end of the scale is one case which seems
8
to deny inalienability of even the power to provide for the public safety 14
though it is best explained, perhaps, on the view that the considerations of
public safety advanced to uphold the revocation in that case were wholly
fictitious.

The court has so explained it.' 49

On the other hand there are

some cases which can be explained only upon the theory that the police
power to protect the general welfare, as well as health, safety and morals,
is not the subject of contract. 1 0
Still another line of cases is inexplicable except on the basis that police
power of the sort there sought to be exercised may validly be contracted
away. Some of these cases antedate the Civil War, 1 1 but others are more
modern. Into this class fall the.decisions that the state or its subordinate
units may contract away the police power to fix rates, 5 2 if they do not sur...
New York & New England R. R. v. Bristol, i5i U. S. 556, 14 Sup. Ct. 437 (1894)
(railroad grade crossings) ; Douglas v. Kentucky, i68 U. S. 488, i8 Sup. Ct. i99 (1897) (lottery grant) ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Nebraska, i7o U. S. 57, i& Sup. Ct. 513 (0898)
(agreement as to erection and repair of viaduct over tracks) ; Northern Pac. Ry, v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 28 Sup. Ct. 341 (i9o8) (same); Texas & New Orleans R. R. v. Miller,
221 U. S. 408, 31 Sup. Ct. 534 (i9H) (liability for negligently causing death of employee) ;
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Goldsboro, supra note 145 (location of railroad tracks and
switching in busy street) ; Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope, 248 U. S. 498, 39 Sup. Ct. 172 (1919)
(location of gasoline storage tanks) ; Denver & Rio Grande R. R. v. Denver, .50 U. S. 241,
37 Sup. Ct. 450 (I919) (location of railroad track in street).
"Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Goldsboro, supra note 145.
'Grand
Trunk Western Ry. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544, 33 Sup. Ct. 303 (1913)

(upholding against attempted repeal contract right to lay second railroad track in street already occupied by single track).
"' See Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Goldsboro, supra note 145, at 560, 34 Sup. Ct. at
369; New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. New Orleans, 281 U. S. 682, 685, 50 Sup. 449, 450
(930).
' Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Emmons, i49 U. S. 364, 13 Sup. Ct. 870 (1893) (fencing right-of-way by railroad) ; Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Kentucky, i6i U. S. 677, i6
Sup. Ct. 714 (i896) (consolidation of parallel and competing railroad lines) ; St. Louis &
S. F. Ry. v. Mathews, i65 U. S. i, i7 Sup. Ct. 243 (1897) (liability of railroad for property
damage) ; Chicago & Alton R. R. v. Tranbarger, supra note 145 (maintenance of water way
to prevent property damage).
. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, i7 U. S. 518 (I819) (educational policy) ; Planters'
Bk. v. Sharp, 47 U. S. 30I (848) (power of bank to transfer negotiable paper) ; Vincennes
University v. Indiana, .55 U. S. 268, 14 L. Ed. 4r6 (852) (educational policy).
'Los

Angeles v. Los Angeles Water Co., 177 U. S. 558, 20 Sup. Ct. 136 (i9oo) ; Detroit
22 Sup. Ct. 40o (i9o2) ; Cleveland v. Cleveland
City Ry., 194 U. S. 517, 24 Sup. Ct. 756 ( 904) ; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co.,
206 U. S. 496, 27 Sup. Ct. 762 (1qo7) ; Minneapolis v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 215 U. S. 417,
30 Sup. Ct. H8 (i91o); Detroit United Ry. v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238, 37 Sup. Ct. 87
(1916) ; Detroit United Ry. v. Detroit, 248 U. S. 429, 39 SuP. Ct. i5, (1919) ; Georgia Ry.
& Pow. Co. v. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432, 43 Sup. Ct. 613 (I922). For late dicta accord see St.

v. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry., 184 U. S. 368,
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render it for too long.'5 3 Likewise here belong the numerous cases which
uphold as binding contractual grants of franchise privileges in the public
streets to various and sundry public utilities. 1 54 Here there is apparently
no limit as to the time for which such a contract may run, inasmuch as the
decisions uphold perpetual franchises with no suggestion that they ever will
become terminable. 5 5 Finally it is not without significance that in a long
line of cases the Court avoids the necessity of facing squarely the issue of
cedability of the police power by construing the alleged contract to involve
no surrender.' 5 6 One cannot, it is obvious, accept the view which has been
advanced 157 that the Supreme Court has gone over completely to the position that the police power in all of its aspects is wholly inalienable. To do
so would deny full faith and credit to too many modern decisions.
Is it possible to deduce from the cases any consistent theory of the
relation between contract and the police power? The answer seems doubtful
at best. Clearly enough attempts to distinguish between health, morals
and safety on the one hand and general welfare on the other must go by the
board. The cases insure that, and if they did not the public need would do
so. A suggestion by counsel in Bank of Oxford v. Love "' that "the power
to legislate can be irrevocably surrendered by contract in those matters
which go merely to the industrial interests of the community" seems unCloud Pub. Ser. Co. v. St. Cloud, 265 U. S. 352, 44 Sup. Ct. 1054 (924) ; Railroad Comm.
v. Los Angeles Ry., 280 U. S. 145, 151, 50 Sup. Ct. 71, 72 (1929).
' See Home Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 2ri U. S. 265, 273, 29 Sup. Ct. 50, 52 (1908).

Orleans Gas Lt. Co. v. Louisiana Lt. & Heat Prodg. Co., ii.q U. S. 65o, 6 Sup.
'New
Ct. 252 (1885) ; St. Tammany Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 120 U. S.
64, 7 Sup. Ct. 405 (1887) ; City Ry. v. Citizens St. R. R., i66 U. S. 557, 17 Sup. Ct. 653
(1897) ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Portland, 227 U. S. 559, 33 Sup. Ct. 308 (913) ; Owensboro
v. Cumberland T. & Tj Co., 230 U. S. 58, 33' Sup. Ct. 988 (913) ; Boise Artesian Hot &
Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U. S. 85, 33 Sup. Ct. 997 (1913) ; RusselP v. Sebastian,
233; U. S. I95, 34 Sup. Ct. 517 (914) ; Northern Ohio Trac. & Lt. Co. v. Ohio, 245 U. S.
57
44 38 Sup. Ct. x96 (I918) ; Ohio Pub. Ser. Co. v. Ohio, 274 U. S. 12, 47 Sup. Ct. 48o
(927).

Owensboro v. Cumberland T. & T. Co.; Northern Ohio Trac. Co. v. Ohio; Ohio Pub.
Ser. Co. v. Ohio, all supra note 154.
Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659 (1878) (location of fertilizer works);
'Fertilizing
Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574, 5 Sup. Ct. 681 (i885) (visitorial inspection of
life insurance company) ; Eagle Ins. Co. v. Ohio, i53 U. S. 446, 14 Sup. Ct. 868 (0894) (reports to state by insurance company) ; New Orleans Gas Lt. Co. v. Drainage Com., 197 U. S.
453, 25 Sup. Ct. 471 (I905) (gas main franchise does not exclude building of drainage canal
in public streets) ; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 56r, 26 Sup. Ct. 341 (i9o6)
(railroad embankment obstructing construction of drainage ditch) ; West Chicago St. R. R.
v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 5o6, 26 Sup. Ct. 518 (i9o6) (construction of tunnel under river impeding later deepening of channel) ; Cosmopolitan Club v. Virginia, 208 U. S. 378, 28 Sup.
Ct. 394 (1908) (corporate charter vs. prohibition law) ; Hammond Pkg. Co. v. Arkansas,
212 U. S. 322, 29 Sup. Ct. 370 (i9o9) (corporate charter vs. anti-trust law) ; Southern Pac.
Co. v. Campbell, 230 U. S. 537, 33 Sup. Ct. 1027 (913) (rate regulation) ; Darling v. Newport News, 249 U. S. 540, 39 Sup. Ct. 371 (1919) (lease of oyster bed vs. municipal sewage
disposal) ; Bank of Oxford v. Love, 250 U. S. 603, 40 Sup. Ct. 22 (1919) (bank charter vs.
state examination) ; Hardin-Wyandot Ltg. Co. v. Upper Sandusky, 25r U. S. 173, 40 Sup.
Ct. 104 (1919) (regulation of electric transmission lines); Kirk v. Maumee Valley Elec.
Co., 279 U. S. 797, 49 Sup. Ct. 507 (1929) (lease of water from canal vs. abandonment of
canal).
caalSee Denny, op. cit. supra note ii8, at 183-188.
10250 U. S. 603, 40 Sup. Ct. 22 (1919).
found in 63 L. Ed. i165.

Quotation from the abstract of the argument

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT CLAUSE AND STATE PROMISES

665

tenable in view of the fact that most of the cases in which the court has
refused to sanction irrevocable surrender do involve industrial matters. No
particular light seems to be derived from the chronological order of the
cases; examples of each point of view may be found almost side by
side in respect of time. There seems little significance in the fact that the
modern cases permitting an alienation of the power to legislate for the general welfare have involved public utilities. As it happens, the cases refusing
to permit such alienation have all involved a particular type of utility-the
railroad, while the cases which avoid a decision by the device of "interpretation" of the alleged contracts cover a wide variety of subjects. One cannot
generalize. It is possible only to give the results of the cases.
It is desirable that the Court should come eventually to some definite
position upon this problem. It is recognized that constitutional law presents
a series of problems in statecraft, in the solution of which stare decisis and
the quest for certainty play a much less important role than in other divisions of the judicial system. None the less, as much certainty as possible
is desirable, here as elsewhere, in the interest of accurate forecasting of the
judicial course. No one will question the undesirability of contemporaneously inconsistent lines of decision. May we not hope that the Supreme
Court will seize the first opportunity to clarify the existing confusion?
It is suggested that the clarification should take the form of a complete
and thorough-going adoption of the principle that the power to make regulations for the general welfare, in all its manifestations, is not a legitimate
subject of contract. To do so would require the overruling among modem
decisions of only the rate and the franchise cases. There is no apparent
reason why public utilities should occupy a specially favored position in
being able to bind the state by contract and there are very strong considerations in favor of maintaining the police power unhampered by any such
restrictions. The trend of our economic and financial development of late
has been toward the concentration of power in the hands of an aristocracy
of wealth and of management, a comparatively small group at the top of a
social organism which has been termed aptly "the new feudalism"."5" In"
other times and in other civilizations wherein there have arisen similar concentrations of power, the very understandable short-sighted selfishness of
the controlling class has resulted in neglect of the interests of the masses,
eventually producing social disorders or violent revolution. Our current
economic ills seem in part traceable to a similar defective vision on the part
of our own overlords. If we can by our democratic institutions sufficiently
dissociate control of the government from the power of the economically
dominant group and can maintain its freedom to act in defense of the gen'- See Pound, The New Feudalism (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 553.
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eral interests against the interests of that group, possibly we may avoid in
our own history the more tragic results of that want of discernment. Such
a modem development of the time-honored American theory of preventing
tyranny by a system of checks and balances seems to be one of the fundamental requisites of an enlightened statecraft today. Removal of the police
power from the field of contract would form an integral part of such a
policy. Any fear of giving too free a rein to regulatory power in this
manner would seem to be groundless so long as due process remains as a
weapon in the hands of the judiciary against arbitrary governmental action.
There remains for consideration one other aspect of police power and
obligation of contract. In a late case 160 a city, in return for the granting
by a railroad of the right of way for certain streets across its tracks and the
construction of crossings, agreed that if other streets were opened it would
pay stipulated amounts for the right of way and that if a particular crossing
were opened it would pay all the cost of construction in return for a grant
of the right of way without cost. Later, under state law passed subsequent
to this agreement, this particular crossing was opened and the cost of construction was apportioned between the city and the railroad. The Supreme
Court held that this impaired the obligation of the prior agreement. To
the obvious argument that the contract was void as affecting the police
power to guard the public safety, the Court responded with a new theory,
namely, that such contracts are bad only if their tendency is to hamper or
to hinder the proper exercise of the police power. 16 1 It found no such
tendency in the contract before it.
just how far this new theory of determining the validity of contracts
will be carried remains to be seen. It has not appeared since and the case
in question seems to mark its debut. The result there reached seems in
conflict with prior decisions, 1 62 despite the Court's attempt at reconciliation. 10 3 Unless carefully applied, it opens the way for the imposition of
'

0

0Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Oklahoma, 271 U. S. 303, 46 Sup. Ct. 517 (1926).

"-s "If the enforcement of its provisions operates to hamper the State's power reasonably
to regulate the construction and the use of the Comanche Avenue crossing, then undoubtedly
the ordinance is void.
"The precise question is whether the agreement of the city to bear the cost of construction is inconsistent with the proper exertion of police power." Supra note i6o, at 307, 46
Sup. Ct. at 518.
"There is nothing in the ordinance that involves any attempt to interfere with or hinder
the proper exertion of the police power." Ibid. 309, 46 Sup. Ct. at 519.
1 Chicago, 13. & Q. R. R. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S.57, I8 Sup. Ct. 513 (1898) ; Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S..583, 28 Sup. Ct. 341 (908).
" The Court distinguishes Northern Pac. Ry. v. Minnesota, supra note 162, on the
ground that there was really no contract because, as the city already owned the right of way
and the railroad was bound to bear the cost of constructing a viaduct, the latter gave no consideration for the city's promise. See Missouri, K. & T.. Ry. v,Oklahoma, 271 U. S.303,
309, 46 Sup. Ct. 512, 519 (1926).

The argument is not convincing.

While the railroad is

under duty to pay the cost of constructing improvements to protect the public safety, whether
the improvements really are necessary for that purpose or whether the cost is not so great
as to make the exaction an arbitrary taking of property under the due process clause is
always open for litigation. For recent examples see Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Board of
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many burdens on the police power by contracts affecting the manner of its
exercise. One can easily conceive of a town refraining from opening a
needed crossing, the expense of which must come from a depleted treasury,
or installing a grade crossing rather than an underpass for similar reasons.
Almost any agreement as to the manner in which the police power shall be
exerted is capable of becoming a clog upon it. Unless the Court is astute
to restrict its application to situations wherein it will not in fact prove a
burden, the new doctrine is capable of much mischief. Would it not be
better to let it die of neglect while it is still young and tender?
Eminent Domain
The power of eminent domain is so closely akin to the general regulatory power in the importance of its free exercise to the efficient promotion
of the general welfare that it would be surprising if it could effectually be
contracted away. The earlier cases avoided a square decision of this point
on the ground that a franchise to operate for a term of years, if regarded
as creating a binding contract, could itself be taken by the power of eminent
domain by making just compensation.'6 4 In 1917, however, a case arose
wherein the state had agreed expressly not to open any street through certain hospital grounds. In upholding the right thereafter to lay out streets
through the grounds by the power of eminent domain the Supreme Court
squarely held that the power, so necessary to efficient government, is inalienable by contract. 165 The doctrine has since been reiterated 166 and seems
clearly sound.
One case raises a doubt. It held that an agreement by a city to purchase a water plant at a price to be determined in a certain manner at the
end of a specified period excludes the right to acquire it by eminent domain
procedure. 167 This seems very much like contracting away the power of
eminent domain. It is possible, however, to reconcile the case with the
accepted view upon the ground that the exercise of eminent domain requires
just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 s that where a contract to purchase has been entered into, just compensation for taking the
contract must be the contract price, and that the only way of establishing
P. U. Comm'rs, 278 U. S. 24, 49 Sup. Ct. 69 (1928) ; New Orleans Pub. Ser. Inc. v. New
Orleans, 281 U. S. 682, 5o Sup. Ct. 449 (1930). This being so, it would seem that the

railroad gave up a reasonably doubtful cause of action, which should be good enough consideration for anybody's promise. See CONTRAcTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L, Inst. 1928) § 76.
"'West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U. S. 507 (1848) ; Long Island Water Supply Co.
v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685. 17 Sup. Ct. 718 (0897).

'

Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U. S. 20, 38 Sup. Ct. 35 (1917).

" "The taking of private property for public use upon just compensation is so often
necessary for the proper performance of governmental functions that the power is deemed
to be essential to the life of the State. It cannot be surrendered, and if attempted to be contracted away, it may be resumed at will." Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472, 480, 44 Sup.
Ct. 369, 370 (1924).
1"7 Superior Water, Lt. & Power Co. v. Superior, 263 U. S. 12., 44 Sup. Ct. 82 (1923).
"=Chicago,B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, i66 U. S. 226, 17 Sup. Ct. 58i (0897).
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the contract price in cases of this kind is by resorting to the procedure prescribed by the contract. Such a limitation upon the doctrine of the inalienability of the power of eminent domain seems likely to do no substantial harm to the public interests and its effects in stabilizing and so in
encouraging contracts of sale to government may be of value. It is at this
point that the power of eminent domain impinges upon the ordinary proprietary power to contract for the acquisition of property, heretofore discussed, and it may well be proper to give precedence to the binding nature of
ordinary proprietary contracts. 169
ContractualCapacity and the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
The writer has discussed elsewhere the comparatively modern doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, suggesting certain apparent inconsistencies in
its development and application and proposing a solution to the problem
of harmonizing the decisions and keeping the new doctrine within proper
bounds. 170 The present topic presents one or two points of contact with
that doctrine which seem worthy of brief consideration.
Preparatory to the discussion let us briefly review the unconstitutional
condition doctrine. Beginning as a policy against state requirements that
foreign corporations should give up their privilege of resorting to the federal
courts as the price of admission to do business within their borders, the
doctrine has grown until, as currently phrased and as applied in at least one
case, 1 7 1 it constitutes a barrier to the exaction in return for favors granted
by a state of the renunciation on the part of any corporation or individual
of any privilege secured by the Constitution of the United States. Thus
broadly applied the doctrine conflicts with a long line of the Supreme Court's
own decisions and presents a serious barrier to effective state bargaining.
It is suggested that a reconciliation both of the decisions and of the conflicting interests involved might be and should be reached upon the basis that
the unconstitutional condition doctrine forbids bartering away those constitutional privileges only which are bound up with the working of our
federal system of government, leaving free subjects of barter those which
172
are bestowed upon the individual as a matter of personal privilege.
The first question suggested by the present topic in relation to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is, may that doctrine be explained upon
the ground that the states have no capacity to bargain away the privileges
which they purport to confer so that the promises of corporations and of
individuals fail for want of consideration? The answer to this question
seems clearly negative. The Supreme Court has always recognized that
' See cases cited supra note 52.
'See Merrill, UnconstitutioialConditions (0929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 879.
' Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm., 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605 (1926).
'= See Merrill, oP. cit. supra note 170, at 892-895.
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admission of a foreign c6rporation to do business within a state is a proper
subject of contraft.173 Consequently the admission cases, which constituted
7 4
the foundations and until Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm.
the only applications of the doctrine, cannot be explained upon the ground
of an absence of quid pro quo for the corporation's promise. Moreover,
the Frost case itself involves the grant of a privilege to operate upon the
public highways akin to a franchise grant, recognized by the Supreme Court
as within the contractual power. 175 Very clearly the unconstitutional condition cases cannot be explained on the ground of failure of consideration.
The second question is somewhat akin. What becomes of state bargaining power, in a very wide and important field, if the powers of police
and of eminent domain are held to be incapable of alienation? Does not
such a view result in a failure of consideration for any promise that is
based upon a surrender or limitation of these powers? There is at least one
case which lends some color to such a view, 176 holding as it does that an
obligation to furnish a city with water falls with the repeal of the exemption from taxation for which it was given. On the other hand, it is to be
remembered that in all cases of this sort there will be an abstention from a
particular course of action or a grant of some privilege by the state, if even
for a comparatively short period. Sufficient care in drafting the agreement
on the part of the public could make this temporary or indefinite grant the
consideration for the grantee's promise. 1 77 It is by no means necessary to
consideration that the promisee be tied up to a performance that will last
as long as that of the promisor, though the Supreme Court appears to have
so assumed in two rate contract cases. 178 Consequently there should be no
substantial threat to state bargaining power in the view that police power
and eminent domain are incapable of alienation or of suspension.
'New York, L. E. & W. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628, 14 Sup. Ct. 952 (1894);
American Smelt'g & Ref. Co. v. Colorado, 204 U. S. 103, 27 Sup. Ct. 198 (19o7).
' Supra note 171.
' See cases cited supra note 154.
''Louisville Water Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. I, 12 Sup. Ct. 346 (1892).
' See I WILisToN, CONmAcrs (1920) § 140.
'San Antonio v. San Antonio Pub. Ser. Co., 255 U. S. 547, 41 Sup. Ct. 428 (1921);
Railroad Comm. v. Los Angeles Ry., 28o U. S. 145, 50 Sup. Ct. 71 (1929).

